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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kevin Louis Ormesher appeals from his conviction for sexual abuse of a 
child under the age of sixteen years. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In late July 2010, fifteen-year-old AR. went to a wedding, where she met 
Ormesher, who was working at the wedding as a disc jockey, and gave him her 
phone number. (Tr., p.165, Ls.12-16; p.166, L.18 - p.167, L.18.) Several days 
later, A R. received a text message, and when she texted back to see who had 
sent it, Ormesher, using only the name "Tyler," identified himself as the disc 
jockey at the wedding. (Tr., p.168, Ls.17-19; p.170, L.24 - p.171, L.3.) 
Ormesher and AR. agreed that AR. would sneak out of her father's home after 
he went to sleep that evening and Ormesher would pick her up in his car and 
they would drink tequila together. (Tr., p.171, L.24 - p.172, L.25.) 
At about 9:30 that evening, AR. snuck out of her father's home and 
waited on a street corner in Coeur d'Alene until she saw Ormesher's sports car 
and got inside. (Tr., p.173, Ls.1-4; p.174, L.11 - p.175, L.12; p.179, Ls.7-12.) 
Ormesher gave AR. a bottle of tequila, which she opened and began drinking 
straight from the bottle. (Tr., p.175, L.21- p.176, L.20.) Ormesher drove AR. to 
the Nettleton Gulch trailhead and parked his car. (Tr., p.179, Ls.13-16; p.215, 
Ls.5-11.) While sitting in the parked car, Ormesher and AR. drank tequila, 
talked, and, after about fifteen minutes, he began kissing her, which she allowed 
(after initially not wanting) as she became increasingly intoxicated. (Tr., p.179, 
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Ls.19-22; p.180, Ls.19-22.) As Ormesher kissed AR., he touched her breasts 
with his hands underneath her bra. (Tr., p.181, Ls.1-16.) He also touched her 
legs. (Tr., p.181, Ls.1-2.) AR.'s shirt and bra came off, with her bra ending up 
on the floor of the passenger side of Ormesher's car. (Tr., p.182, Ls.13-22; 
p.219, Ls.1-5.) AR. was so intoxicated she started "fogging out" and blacking 
out. (Tr., p.182, Ls.7-12.) 
Kootenai County Deputy Sheriff Shawn Lindblom was on routine patrol 
that evening, and when he drove to the Nettleton Gulch trailhead, he noticed 
Ormesher's car parked there with its headlights on. (Tr., p.215, Ls.5-11; p.216, 
Ls.2-6; p.217, Ls.2-7.) Deputy Lindblom observed that Ormesher was standing 
outside the passenger side of the car facing AR., who was sitting in the 
passenger seat with the door open. (Tr., p.217, Ls.4-10.) When the deputy 
approached Ormesher's car, he saw AR. attempting to pull a shirt down over her 
head with her breasts completely exposed. (Tr., p.219, Ls.16-25.) The deputy 
also noticed a bra was lying on the passenger seat floorboard. (Tr., p.219, Ls.1-
5.) In trying to converse with AR., Deputy Lindblom determined she was 
extremely intoxicated and incoherent, and called an ambulance to the scene to 
make sure she was alright. (Tr., p.220, Ls.1-13.) 
Ormesher was charged with sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen and dispensing alcohol to a minor. (R., pp.39-40.) Prior to trial, the 
charge of dispensing alcohol to a minor was dismissed on the state's motion. 
(R., pp.50, 68-69.) After a jury trial, Ormesher was found guilty of sexual abuse 
of a child under the age of sixteen. (R., p.140.) The district court sentenced 
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Ormesher to a unified six-year term with two years fixed, and retained its 
jurisdiction for up to one year. (R., pp.157-159.) Ormesher filed a timely appeal. 
(R., pp.160-163.) 
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ISSUES 
Ormesher states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in instructing the jury because the 
jury instructions created an impermissible variance from the 
charging document? 
2. Did the district court err by permitting the State to cross-
examine Curtis Ormesher regarding Mr. Ormesher's prior 
convictions? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Ormesher failed to show a fatal variance between the charging 
document and the jury instructions? 
2. Did the district court correctly permit the prosecutor to ask Ormesher'S 
uncle whether knowledge about Ormesher'S convictions for stalking and violation 
of a no-contact order would affect his opinion about Ormesher's trustworthiness? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ormesher Has Failed To Show A Fatal Variance Between The Charging 
Document And The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Ormesher contends, as he did at trial,1 that there was a fatal variance 
between the Information and the jury instructions in regard to the type of sexual 
contact Ormesher was alleged to have committed. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) 
Contrary to Ormesher's argument, the difference between the language in the 
Information and the elements instruction does not constitute a fatal variance; 
therefore, Ormesher's conviction must be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law is a question of law over which an appellate court 
exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 
(1997). Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the 
evidence and jury instructions at trial is a question of law given free review on 
appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 
1998). Likewise, whether such a variance is fatal to the conviction is given free 
review. kL. 
1 See Tr., p.285, L.16 - p.286, L.18 (defense counsel objected based on an 
alleged variance between the "to convict" instruction and the Information); see 
also Tr., p.506, L.20 - p.510, L.24 (defense counsel repeated his variance 
argument after jury wrote a question to court during deliberations asking, "[i]s it 
just the breast or any sexual contact?"). 
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C. Ormesher Has Failed To Show A Fatal Variance Because All Of The 
Sexual Contact At Issue In The Trial Were Part Of The Charged Crime 
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts 
different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 
100, 105 (1979). A variance may also occur where the jury instructions allow the 
jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more alternative 
theories other than what is alleged in the charging document. State v. Windsor, 
110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166,90 
P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Not all variances are fatal because "there is a marked distinction between 
a 'mere variance' and a variance which is automatically fatal because it amounts 
to an impermissible 'constructive amendment.'" State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 
49,89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 
565-66, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Ct. App. 1993)). Where the charging terms of 
the Information or charging document have been altered, literally or in effect, a 
constructive amendment has occurred. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 973, 
188 P.3d 912, 915 (2008) (citing United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(9th Cir.2001 )). A variance requires a reversal only where "it deprives the 
defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double 
jeopardy." State v. Adamcik, _ P.3d __ , 2012 WL 206006 (Idaho 2012) 
(quoting Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18,716 P.2d at 1189-90; State v. Wolfrum, 
145 Idaho 44, 47, 175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007)). A defendant is deprived 
of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or 
presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182, 191 P.3d 
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1098, 1103 (2008). Application of these legal standards to the facts of this case 
shows no fatal variance. Although the jury was allowed to consider facts not 
specifically pled, those facts (kissing and touching a thigh) related to conduct 
included within the scope of the charged offense. Thus, there was neither a 
constructive amendment to a new offense nor prejudice in preparation of the 
defense. 
The Information charged that on July 27, ,2010, Ormesher committed 
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen for having "sexual contact with 
A.R., a child under the age of sixteen, to wit: 15 years old, by touching the breast 
of said child with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant." (R., 
pp.39-40.) In the elements instruction, Instruction No. 12, the court instructed the 
jury, in relevant part, that in order to find Ormesher guilty of sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen, the state must prove: 
3. the defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, had sexual 
contact with A.R. not amounting to lewd conduct; 
(R., p.126 (Instruction No.12).) The jury was further instructed that "'[s]exual 
contact' means any physical contact between the child and any person which is 
caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self contact." (R., 
p.129 (Instruction No. 14a).) During its deliberations, the jury submitted the 
following question to the court, which the court read into the record as follows: 
Request judge needs to clarify charges, period. Question 
Number 3, Page 12, does not say anything about touching the 
breast. Is it just the breast or any sexual contact? 
(Tr., p.506, Ls.21-24; see R., pp.109-110.) 
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Ormesher contends there was a fatal variance because the jury instruction 
on the elements of the crime "permitted the jury to find Mr. Ormesher guilty 
based on any act of sexual contact" (Appellant's Brief, p.7), and because AR. 
testified that he kissed her, "he could have, therefore, been found guilty simply by 
touching or kissing AR. even if the jury did not believe that he touched her 
breasts" (id., pp.9-10). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the discrepancy between the language used in 
the Information and the elements instruction constitutes a variance,2 Ormesher 
has failed to carry his burden of establishing a variance of constitutional 
significance that requires reversal. As noted, a variance is fatal if it amounts to a 
constructive amendment or if "'it deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice 
or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy,'" Adamcik, 2012 WL 206006 at 
*30 (quoting Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716 P.2d at 1189-90). Review 
shows neither of these circumstances in this case. 
Ormesher does not argue that the alleged variance rose to the level of a 
constructive amendment, nor can he. Ormesher was charged with, and 
convicted of, the single crime of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. 
Moreover, Ormesher could not be tried for separate counts of sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen for kissing AR., or for touching her leg (etc.) because those 
(presumably) sexual contacts occurred as part of a single course of conduct in 
2 In resolving a variance claim, the court must first decide whether a variance 
exists. State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747,750,69 P.3d 167, 170 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Inasmuch as the jury's question reflects at least some confusion between the 
differing language used in the Information and the elements instruction, the state 
will assume for the sake of argument that a variance occurred in this case. 
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Ormesher's car during which Ormesher also touched A.R.'s breast. In Jones, 
140 Idaho at 48,89 P.3d at 888, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
Idaho Code § 19-1432 allows for the charging of two or 
more offenses in the same indictment or information if the offenses 
charged "are of the same or similar character or are based on the 
same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan." However, multiplicity may occur if a defendant is charged 
with a single offense in more than one count of the information or 
the indictment. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713-14, 905 
P.2d 642, 646-47 (Ct. App. 1995). The danger of multiplicitous 
charging is that a defendant could be subjected to multiple 
punishments for a single offense. State v. Aguilar, 135 Idaho 894, 
897,26 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Whether a circumstance encompasses a single offense or 
multiple offenses depends upon whether there were separate and 
distinct prohibited acts. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267, 16 P.3d 
937,943 (Ct. App. 2000); Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713-14,905 P.2d 
at 646-47. This determination requires an inquiry into the 
"circumstances of the conduct, and consideration of the 'intent and 
objective of the actor.'" State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 725 
P.2d 115, 119 (1986) (quoting In re Ward, 64 Cal.2d 672, 51 
Cal. Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400 (1966)). Thus, although a series of 
sexual contacts which occur as part of a single incident constitute 
only one count of lewd conduct under I. C. § 18-1508, a number of 
sexual acts occurring on separate occasions constitute multiple 
offenses. Miller, 135 Idaho at 266-67, 16 P. 3d at 942-43. 
(Emphasis added) (holding two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct based on 
acts done during different trips to Jones' trailer were not multiplicitous). Under 
Jones' rendition of the law on multiplicity, Ormesher could not have been, and 
cannot be, charged with another count of the same crime (i.e., sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen) based on slightly different conduct (i.e., kissing A.R. or 
touching her leg (etc.)) occurring during the same incident involved in his current 
case. 
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If Ormesher had been charged in a separate count with sexual abuse of a 
child under sixteen based upon his kissing AR. or touching her leg on the night 
they parked in his car, he would no doubt have objected that the charge was 
multiplicitous. See id. Ormesher would certainly be unwilling to admit that the 
state could now charge him with or punish him for another count of sexual abuse 
of a child under sixteen, but would instead claim that such a charge or 
punishment is barred under double jeopardy by his current conviction. Because 
Ormesher cannot be charged with the same crime occurring during the same 
incident, he is at no risk of being placed in double jeopardy.3 
As a result, there was no constructive amendment or fatal variance. 
Indeed, the jury was not required to determine the exact method by which 
Ormesher had sexual contact with AR. as they sat in his parked car. See Schad 
v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality with fifth Justice concurring in the 
result) Uury need not agree on exact means of commission of crime of murder); 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) ("The jury 
could have found Severson guilty of murdering his wife by overdosing her, 
3 Ormesher claims that he is at risk of being placed in double jeopardy, stating: 
By not requiring the jury to make a conclusion on the manner in 
which Mr. Ormesher committed the crime, the court left Mr. 
Ormesher open to the risk of double jeopardy because it is not 
clear what specific act Mr. Ormesher was convicted of. The 
variance in this case was, therefore, fatal. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Ormesher does not explain how he could be "open to 
the risk of double jeopardy" for any of his actions during the time he was parked 
in his car with AR. Because Ormesher was charged with sexual abuse of a child 
under sixteen and convicted of that same crime, there was no constructive 
amendment of the charge, and because all of the sexual contact at issue during 
the trial was part of the charged crime, there was no fatal variance. 
10 
suffocating her, or both."); State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho, 174, 178, 953 P.2d 614, 
618 (1998) (Schroeder, J., concurring) (belief that controlled substance 
possessed was different than that charged is not defense); Downing v. State, 136 
Idaho 367,373,33 P.3d 841,847 (Ct. App. 2001) Uury not required to agree on 
exact act constituting offense). Because Ormesher was charged with sexual 
abuse of a child under sixteen, it is ultimately irrelevant whether he was found to 
have kissed her, touched her leg, or touched her breasts, during the same 
incident. Regardless of the method Ormesher used to commit the crime of 
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, there is no chance he was convicted of a 
crime for which he was not charged. 
As noted above, the jury was not required to find whether Ormesher 
touched A.R.'s breast before it could convict him of sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen. Likewise, because the crime ultimately charged and submitted to the 
jury was sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, an amendment of the Information 
from "touching the breast" to "kissing" or "touching the leg" as the means 
whereby sexual contact occurred is not the sort of amendment that could result in 
Ormesher having been convicted of a crime other than that charged. Ormesher's 
claim thus fails to establish a constructive amendment as a matter of law. 
Ormesher has also failed to show that the variance deprived him of fair 
notice. Adamcik, 2012 WL 206006 at *30; Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18,716 
P.2d at 1189-90. A defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or 
embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his defense, Hickman, 146 
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Idaho at 182,191 P.3d at 1103. Ormesher has failed to meet this burden. In 
regard to "fair notice," Ormesher argues: 
The charging document put Mr. Ormesher on notice that he had to 
defend against an allegation that he touched A R. 's breasts. 
However, due to the jury instruction, he had to defend against an 
allegation that he touched A. R. at all with the intent to gratify his 
sexual desire. He could have, therefore, been found guilty simply 
by touching or kissing AR. even if the jury did not believe that he 
touched her breasts. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10 (emphasis added).) Although Ormesher asserts he 
was not given fair notice he might have to defend against an allegation that he 
kissed or touched AR. with the intent to gratify his sexual desire, he does not 
explain how he was "misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of 
his defense." Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182,191 P.3d at 1103. At trial, Ormesher 
testified that he never kissed AR. during the incident. (Tr., p.261, Ls.12-19.) 
Apart from his generalized complaint that he had to defend against having sexual 
contact with AR. other than by touching her breast, Ormesher fails to divulge just 
how he was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his 
defense. By testifying that he did not kiss AR. during the incident, Ormesher did 
all that could possibly be done to contest the point. Ormesher has failed to show 
how any lack of notice he might have had misled or embarrassed him in 
preparing for or presenting his defense. There is no indication in the record that, 
had Ormesher been provided the notice he claims the instructions deprived him 
of, he would have testified or conducted his cross-examination of the state's 
witnesses any differently, or that he would have presented a different theory of 
his case at trial. 
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Ormesher has failed to demonstrate that failure to specifically limit the 
jury's consideration to only touching of the breasts created a fatal variance. He 
has not shown how there was a constructive amendment or that he has been 
deprived of his right to fair notice, or that the alleged variance leaves him open to 
the risk of double jeopardy. See Adamcik, 2012 WL 206006 at *30; Hickman, 
146 Idaho at 182, 191 P.3d at 1103. 
II. 
The District Court Correctly Permitted The Prosecutor To Ask Ormesher's Uncle 
Whether Knowledge About Ormesher's Convictions For Stalking And Violation Of 
A No-Contact Order Would Affect His Opinion About Ormesher's Trustworthiness 
A. Introduction 
During the defense case-in-chief, Curtis Ormesher, Ormesher's uncle, 
was asked on direct examination whether Ormesher is a moral person, and 
responded that he is a moral person and is trustworthy. (Tr., p.359, L.25 - p.360, 
L.8.) Over Ormesher's objection, the district court permitted the prosecutor to 
ask Curtis Ormesher on cross-examination whether his opinion of his nephew's 
trustworthiness would change if he knew Ormesher had convictions for first 
degree stalking in 2007 and violation of a no contact order in 2009. (Tr., p.363, 
L.17 - p.364, L.20; p.367, Ls.6-17.) On appeal, Ormesher argues "that the 
district court erred in concluding that his convictions for stalking and violating a 
no-contact order were relevant to his truthfulness. The district court therefore 
erred by permitting the State to cross-examine Curtis Ormesher with these 
convictions." (Appellant's Brief, p.11 (emphasis added).) 
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Despite framing the evidentiary issue decided by the district court as 
centering on Ormesher's truthfulness, the record reveals that the court's ruling 
and the testimony upon which it was based concerned Ormesher's morality and 
trustworthiness. Because Ormesher has failed to discuss, much less refute, the 
district court's basis for allowing the prosecution to rebut Curtis Ormesher's 
opinion testimony that Ormesher is trustworthy, he has failed to show error. See, 
~, State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364,366,956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Cl. App. 1998) 
(trial court will be affirmed when basis for decision unchallenged on appeal). 
Even if the district court's evidentiary ruling is considered, Ormesher has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,218,245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
C. Because Ormesher's Uncle Testified That, In His Opinion, Ormesher Is 
Trustworthy. The District Court Properly Permitted The Prosecutor To 
Cross-Examine Him About Specific Incidents Of Crime Relevant To That 
Opinion 
In Ormesher's case-in-chief, his uncle, Curtis Ormesher, was asked by 
Ormesher's trial attorney if he had an opinion "as to whether [Ormesher] is a 
moral person?" (Tr., p.359, L.25 - p.360, L.1.) Ormesher's uncle responded: 
Absolutely. I trust him - I'm semi-reclusive, and he's one of 
the only people I would trust in my home when I take vacations. I 
trust him to watch my cats. I trust him with everything. We go on 
jobs for some pretty high-end clientele. Uh, I trust him in their 
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offices, in their homes, and they trust him, also. He doesn't pry into 
things. He's just trustworthy. 
(Tr., p.360, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) Curtis Ormesher's confirmation that 
Ormesher is "absolutely" a moral person and seven references to trust (or 
trustworthy) leaves no room to doubt that his opinion was about Ormesher's 
morality and trustworthiness - not truthfulness. 
During cross-examination of Curtis Ormesher, the prosecutor advised the 
trial judge, outside the presence of the jury, that he intended to ask Ormesher's 
uncle whether his opinion that Ormesher is moral and trustworthy "would ... 
change knowing he has been convicted of first degree stalking ... in 2007," and 
of a "no contact order violation in 2009." (Tr., p.363, L.17 - p.364, L.20.) 
Ormesher's trial counsel objected to the questions on the grounds that the fact of 
the prior convictions were not relevant to credibility and were "more prejudicial 
than probative of any point at issue," and requested that, if the questions were 
admitted, the first degree stalking offense be referred to as a misdemeanor. (Tr., 
p.365, Ls.21-25; p.366, L.22 - p.367, L.5.) 
The trial court ruled the proffered questions were admissible, initially 
phrasing the issue in terms of Ormesher's "honesty," but quickly clarifying that 
the relevant testimony only concerned Ormesher's "trustworthiness." The court 
explained: 
Well, I think both of these offenses are probative as to the 
issue of honesty of the defendant and this witness's, Mr. Curtis 
Ormesher's, knowledge regarding his opinion that he's already 
stated as to the trustworthiness and honesty of the defendant. 
Really the testimony is all about trust, and so I think both of these 
offenses really go directly to trust, so for purposes of impeachment 
I think they're highly probative, highly relevant. 
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I'm gonna allow the inquiry. We may be in a situation where 
the State's stuck with the witness's answer. We might not be able 
to use extrinsic evidence. . .. 
(Tr., p.367, LS.6-17 (emphasis added).) After several comments by the 
attorneys, the court concluded: 
I think if the questions would've been posed of this witness in terms 
of honesty, which is ordinarily what's allowed under the rule rather 
than trustworthiness, I think we'd have a whole different issue here, 
but my notes show nothing but trusted in my home, trusted in 
client's home, I trust him, he's trustworthy. I think that's what we're 
left with. All right. That's my ruling. 
(Tr., p.368, L.24 - p.369, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
Despite Curtis Ormesher'S testimony about Ormesher'S trustworthiness 
and the district court's corresponding ruling, in the introduction to this issue in his 
brief on appeal, Ormesher asserts "the district court erred in concluding that his 
convictions for stalking and violating a no-contact order were relevant to his 
truthfulness." (Appellant's Brief, p.11 (emphasis added).) In subsequently 
reiterating in his brief what Curtis Ormesher testified about, and quoting what the 
district court found, Ormesher temporarily used the correct terminology -
"trustworthy" and "trustworthiness." (Id., pp.11-12.) However, from that point on 
in his brief, Ormesher abandons all reference to "trust," and reverts back to 
claiming that "[s]talking and violating a no-contact order are not relevant to a 
witness's truthfulness." (Id., p.13.) Ormesher ends his appellate brief repeating 
his contention that "the district court erred by concluding that the prior convictions 
were relevant to Mr. Ormesher's truthfulness." (Id., p.14.) Having given a new 
label (i.e., truthfulness) to the nature of Curtis Ormesher's testimony and the 
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district court's ruling, Ormesher analogizes to !.R.E. 609, and argues that 
questions to his uncle about Ormesher's two convictions were inadmissible 
because they do not reflect acts of deceit or dishonesty. (ld., pp.12-14.) 
Contrary to Ormesher's argument, neither his uncle's testimony nor the 
district court's actual ruling concerned Ormesher's character for truthfulness. 
Rather, Curtis Ormesher gave opinion testimony about Ormesher's morality and 
trustworthiness. Because the court made its evidentiary ruling on the basis of 
Curtis Ormesher's testimony about Ormesher's "trustworthiness," Ormesher has 
failed to challenge the actual ruling of the court, which should be affirmed on the 
basis of its actual ruling. See Goodwin, 131 Idaho at 366, 956 P.2d at 1313. 
Even if Ormesher had properly challenged the court's actual ruling, he would be 
unable to show error. 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405(a), when Ormesher's uncle testified 
that Ormesher was trustworthy, he opened the door for the prosecutor to ask him 
relevant questions tending to rebut that characteristic. Rule 405(a) states: 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of 
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may 
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form 
of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In a case involving a similar situation to Ormesher'S case, State v. Harvey, 
142 Idaho 527, 129 P.3d 1276 (Ct. App. 2006), Harvey was charged with sexual 
abuse of a minor under sixteen and indecent exposure. During trial, character 
witnesses testified about Harvey's "good character when dealing with or being 
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around children," and the prosecutor rebutted that testimony by cross-examining 
the witnesses about evidence that Harvey had committed three crimes in the 
past - battery, domestic violence, and disturbing the peace. kL at 532-33, 129 
P.3d at 1281-82. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained and held: 
Character evidence ordinarily is inadmissible for the purpose 
of showing that an individual acted in conformity therewith on any 
particular occasion. I.R.E. 404(a); State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17,19, 
794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App.1990). A criminal defendant may, 
however, offer evidence of a pertinent character trait, provided the 
prosecution is afforded an opportunity to rebut the same. I.R.E. 
404(a)(1); Rupp, 118 Idaho at 19, 794 P.2d at 289. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404 requires the defense to "open the door" regarding 
evidence of good character of the accused before the state can 
counter with any evidence regarding the defendant's bad character. 
Rupp, 118 Idaho at 19, 794 P.2d at 289. Character evidence may 
usually be admitted only as testimony in the form of an opinion or 
testimony as to reputation. I.R.E. 405(a). On cross-examination, 
though, a party may inquire about relevant specific instances of 
conduct. Id. 
In this case, opInIon evidence regarding Harvey's good 
character around children could be rebutted by evidence that 
Harvey had been previously found guilty of battery and domestic 
battery crimes not involving children. It would be reasonable for a 
person to be hesitant to allow children to be cared for or influenced 
by an individual with a history of violent crimes of any type. Just as 
Harvey offered opinion evidence of his good character around 
children, the district court properly allowed the state to introduce 
evidence that would make a reasonable person doubt his or her 
opinion of the good character attested to. Therefore, we conclude 
the ruling of the district court, regarding the admissibility of Harvey's 
battery and domestic battery crimes, is soundly reasoned and well 
within the boundaries of its discretion. Accordingly, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to admit 
evidence of the specific crimes of battery and domestic battery to 
challenge the opinion evidence of Harvey's good character around 
children.[4] 
4 The Harvey court also determined that Harvey's disorderly conduct conviction 
was improperly permitted to rebut the testimony of Harvey's character witnesses 
because such a crime includes a broad range of conduct and is not the sort of 
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142 Idaho at 533, 129 P.3d at 1282. 
The Harvey decision concluded that "[i]t would be reasonable for a person 
to be hesitant to allow children to be cared for or influenced by an individual with 
a history of violent crimes of any type." kl Similarly, in Ormesher's case, it 
would be reasonable for a person to doubt Ormesher's morality and 
"trustworthiness" knowing he had been convicted of stalking and violation of a 
no-contact order. Even though stalking and violation of a no-contact order may 
not be crimes of deceit or dishonesty, they are, as the district court found, 
relevant to the question of trustworthiness. When the prosecutor said, "on the 
face of it a stalking conviction certainly carries a strong inference of lack of 
trustworthiness[,]" and explained that obtaining a copy of the Nevada stalking 
statute as suggested by Ormesher's trial counsel was not warranted, the district 
court responded, "Well, and I agree." (Tr., p.368, Ls.19-24.) The offense of 
violation of a no-contact order also denotes a lack of trustworthiness by showing 
a person could not even be trusted to comply with an order by a court. 
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that the two crimes were 
relevant to the question of whether Ormesher was trustworthy. Therefore, 
Ormesher has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in 
permitting the prosecutor to ask Curtis Ormesher whether knowing about such 
crimes would affect his opinion about Ormesher's trustworthiness. 
crime reasonable people would conclude negatively impacts a person's fitness to 
be around children. Harvey, 142 Idaho at 533,129 P.3d at 1282. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2012. 
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